The Impact of an Urban Wal-Mart Store on Area Businesses:  An Evaluation of One Chicago Neighborhood\u27s Experience by Center for Urban Research and Learning, et al.
Loyola University Chicago
Loyola eCommons
Center for Urban Research and Learning:
Publications and Other Works Centers
12-2009
The Impact of an Urban Wal-Mart Store on Area
Businesses: An Evaluation of One Chicago
Neighborhood's Experience
Center for Urban Research and Learning
Loyola University Chicago
Julie Davis
Loyola University Chicago, jdavi14@luc.edu
David Merriman
University of Illinois at Chicago, dmerrim@uic.edu
Lucia Samayoa
Loyola University Chicago, luciasamayoa@gmail.com
Brian Flanagan
Loyola University Chicago
See next page for additional authors
This Technical Report is brought to you for free and open access by the Centers at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Center for
Urban Research and Learning: Publications and Other Works by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please
contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Center for Urban Research and Learning; Davis, Julie; Merriman, David; Samayoa, Lucia; Flanagan, Brian; Baiman, Ron; and Persky,
Joseph, "The Impact of an Urban Wal-Mart Store on Area Businesses: An Evaluation of One Chicago Neighborhood's Experience"
(2009). Center for Urban Research and Learning: Publications and Other Works. Paper 3.
http://ecommons.luc.edu/curl_pubs/3
Authors
Center for Urban Research and Learning, Julie Davis, David Merriman, Lucia Samayoa, Brian Flanagan, Ron
Baiman, and Joseph Persky
This technical report is available at Loyola eCommons: http://ecommons.luc.edu/curl_pubs/3
The Impact of an Urban Wal-Mart Store on Area Businesses:  
 An Evaluation of One Chicago Neighborhood’s Experience 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
Julie Davis,† David Merriman, †† Lucia Samayoa, † Brian Flanagan, †  
Ron Baiman, †† and Joe Persky†† 
 
 
 
 
 
 
December 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research report prepared and published by the  
 
Center for Urban Research and Learning 
Loyola University Chicago.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support for this research from the 
Woods Fund of Chicago. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
† Center for Urban Research and Learning, Loyola University Chicago 
††
 University of Illinois Chicago
For more information contact: David Merriman, Economics Department, University of 
Illinois Chicago, m/c 144, 601 S. Morgan St., Chicago, IL 60607 MC-144  (312) 413-
2368, dmerrim@uic.edu; or Julie Davis. Center for Urban Research and Learning, Loyola 
University Chicago, 820 N. Michigan Ave., Chicago, IL 60611, 312-915-7529, 
jdavi14@luc.edu  
 
 
The Center for Urban Research and Learning (CURL) of Loyola University Chicago 
seeks to promote equality and to improve people's lives in communities throughout the 
Chicago metropolitan region.  CURL pursues this goal by building and supporting 
collaborative university-community  research and education efforts. These partnerships 
connect Loyola faculty and students with community and nonprofit organizations, civic 
groups, and government agencies. Such collaborations link the skills and knowledge 
present within every community with the specialized knowledge and academic discipline 
of a vital urban university.  
More information on CURL and an electronic version of this report are available at: 
www.luc.edu/curl. 
  i 
Executive Summary 
 
 Having achieved nearly complete coverage of non-urban and suburban markets, 
mega-retailer Wal-Mart has turned its attention to urban expansion.  Evaluations of Wal-
Mart’s impact on urban retail businesses and local employment are necessary to inform 
policy makers, scholars, and community activists looking to improve economic 
opportunities for inner-city residents. This study focuses on the Wal-Mart store that 
opened on the West Side of Chicago in September 2006.   
 
 The research team conducted a series of three surveys of retail businesses in an area 
within a four-mile radius of the Wal-Mart location at 4650 W. North Ave, Chicago IL 
60639.  This area is roughly bounded by Irving Park Avenue to the north, Western 
Avenue on the east, Roosevelt Avenue on the south, and Harlem Avenue on the west.  
The surveys were administered in the summers of 2006 (before the Wal-Mart opening), 
2007 and 2008.  The basic sample follows 306 enterprises 82 of which went out of 
business over the study period.     
 
 A key finding of the survey is that the probability of going out of business during the 
study period was significantly higher for establishments close to the Wal-Mart location.  
This probability fell off at a rate of 6 percent per mile in all directions from the Wal-Mart 
store.  The relationship to distance was particularly strong for establishments in 
electronics, toys, office supplies, general merchandise, hardware, home furnishings, and 
drugs.  Closings for apparel stores, shoe stores, sporting goods, children’s stores and 
video/music showed no statistically significant relation to distance.  
 
 Based on the estimated relationship between probability of store closings and 
proximity to Wal-Mart, the research team estimates that Wal-Mart’s opening has resulted 
in the loss of about 300 full-time equivalent jobs in its own and nearby zip codes.  There 
is considerable uncertainty attached to these calculations.  However, they suggest a loss 
about equal to Wal-Mart’s own addition to employment in the area.  These estimates 
support the contention that large-city Wal-Marts absorb retail sales from other city stores 
without significantly expanding the market.  There was no evidence from the sample that 
stores remaining in business suffered employment losses.     
 
 In addition to the surveys of West Side establishments, the research team obtained 
sales tax data from the Illinois Department of Revenue.  These data from 2000 through 
2008 are used to estimate quarterly taxable sales for the Wal-Mart zip code (60639) and 
neighboring zip codes.  A trend analysis is performed for each zip code.  In each case, the 
question is whether trends in sales changed after the Wal-Mart opening.  For Wal-Mart’s 
own zip code, 60639, there is no evidence of an overall upturn in sales.  Indeed, if the 
sample is limited to the six quarters (18 months) before and after Wal-Mart opened there 
is a significant decline in the trend of zip code sales.  For this same period, zip code 
60651, the closest neighbor to the Wal-Mart zip code, also shows a significant negative 
break-in-trend as does zip code 60622.  No other city zip codes in the area show 
significant changes.  Unfortunately these data include sales in a range of establishments 
not directly competing with Wal-Mart.  (The Illinois Department of Revenue refused to 
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release more detailed data.)  Nevertheless, the results on sales are broadly consistent with 
the estimates based on the survey data.  
 
 Data from the Illinois Department of Employment Security on retail employment in 
Wal-Mart’s own zip code and nearby zip codes are also broadly consistent with the 
survey findings.  Retail employment levels in Wal-Mart’s own zip code show no 
significant change, presumably because of the addition of Wal-Mart’s own employees.  
But retail employment trends in neighboring zip codes show a negative effect after Wal-
Mart’s opening.  This effect is significant in the period 2003-2008.   
 
 Overall, the weight of evidence suggests that the Wal-Mart opening on the West Side 
led to the displacement of a range of businesses.  There is no evidence that Wal-Mart 
sparked any significant net growth in economic activity or employment in the area.  The 
study findings must be interpreted cautiously.  The data used are often not ideal, although 
the best currently available.  Still the conclusions reached here are similar to those other 
researchers have found for Wal-Mart impacts in small towns and suburbs.  Under the 
circumstances, claims that the Chicago Wal-Mart has led to significant economic 
development in nearby areas must be considered skeptically.            
 
  iii 
Community Leader Perspectives on the Study 
 
The Center for Urban Research and Learning convened two small gatherings of 
community leaders to review this report and provide their perspectives on its implications 
for the ongoing discussion of economic development in Chicago communities – 
particularly low-income communities.   Although significant input was received from 
local businesses in the course of completing research for this report, we felt that it was 
valuable to receive further input from community-based leaders -- especially those active 
in neighborhoods on Chicago’s West Side, where the current Wal-Mart store is located, 
and the South Side where there have been many discussions about the possible location 
of a new Wal-Mart store.   The comments below are not intended to be a survey of 
“community opinion,” rather they are provided as an initial reaction from leaders who 
have been active in economic development work in Chicago’s low- and moderate-income 
communities for many years.   Those involved in these discussions included leaders from 
Lawndale Christian Development Corporation, West Humboldt Park Development 
Council, Enlace Chicago, Erie Neighborhood House, Good Jobs Chicago, and Centers 
for New Horizons. 
 
 While community leaders recognized the contribution that Wal-Mart was providing at 
its new store on Chicago’s West Side in terms of retail shopping and employment 
opportunities, they were particularly impressed with the report’s finding that these 
contributions did not represent additions to existing local economic opportunities.     
Wal-Mart’s sales were replacing, but not enhancing, the retail activity in the community, 
as indicated by relatively steady sales tax revenues before and after the addition of the 
store.   Similarly Wal-Mart was replacing, but not enhancing, employment opportunities 
in the community. 
 
 The fact that Wal-Mart  is “a wash” in terms of sales revenue for the city and jobs for 
local residents has particular relevance to current policy debates about the need for new 
Wal-Mart stores, or for that matter, more big box developments in Chicago’s 
neighborhoods.    Such stores are not producing the new opportunities and a financial 
boon for the city as was promised or forecast by some.  As Tom Otto at the West 
Humboldt Park Development Council, commented, “What this study confirms [is that]… 
there is a pie and you’re just divvying it up differently in terms of sales, number of jobs; 
it’s just shifting.”   
 
 This means that communities should not be so quick to see Wal-Mart as a panacea to 
local economic struggles.   The development of such a store is one alternative, but not the 
only one.   Leaders suggested that big box developments should be view as one strategy 
in the city’s arsenal to address economic development, but not the only one.  
 
 There were numerous suggestions that additional strategies be considered in addition 
to big box developments. Maureen Hellwig from Erie Neighborhood House 
recommended that just as the city has an ordinance that requires so many units of 
affordable housing to be included in certain kinds of multi-family development, maybe a 
similar “inclusionary business” ordinance should be enacted insuring that nearby small 
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businesses can be enhanced by such new development.   Wal-Mart has indicated that it is 
reaching out to local businesses on a voluntary basis, but community leaders felt that a 
stronger government role in structuring and mandating these benefits would be 
appropriate. 
 
 Other leaders suggested that we should not be so quick to “put all of our eggs in one 
basket.”  In some communities maintaining a diversity of shopping options, rather than 
building one big store, may be the more desirable development avenue.  Dhyia 
Thompson from Southsiders Organizing for Unity and Liberation (SOUL), part of the 
Good Jobs Chicago coalition,  responded that Wal-Mart is not the “economic engine” that 
will push urban community economic development forward.   Specifically referencing 
Chatham and Austin, Thompson states:  “Plopping a rural model store into an urban 
community doesn't support a diversity of retail & commercial businesses. A community 
with one big box that displaces existing jobs and businesses is not a desirable solution. I 
feel that this study is just a confirmation that Wal-Mart will just end up replacing the 
resources that already exist.” 
 
 There are economic engines in some communities that might be better enhanced by 
strategies other than big box developments.  Cesar Nunez from Enlace Chicago 
recognized that business ownership succession is a problem in many Chicago 
communities; in some cases communities lose businesses when aging owners do not have 
someone to whom to sell the business they have developed.   It is possible that where 
significant patterns of such business closures have taken place, big box developments are 
a50 
 logical solution.  However, Nunez notes that in communities such as Little Village where 
there has been a steady growth of new immigrants and demand for new businesses, small 
retailers have found ways to continue their business.  There is a healthy entrepreneurial 
energy to develop new small businesses – an energy that could be lost if a big box 
development was given any particular advantages over small businesses. 
 
 Other suggested alternatives or complements to Wal-Mart-scale developments were 
retail business incubators.   These have been used in some Chicago neighborhoods and 
could be more systematically used in local retail development.  Related to this are small 
business “malls,” such as the Azteca Mall where 100 local vendors created their own 
mall and bought an old industrial building to house it.  Similarly, the experience and 
resource represented by local chambers of commerce in promoting local business should 
not be ignored in the race to attract the big developments.   These chambers, particularly 
with government and foundation assistance, have the local credibility and local 
experience to strengthen the local retail climate. 
 
 The overall community leader response emerging from our discussions is that elected 
officials should not be so quick to invite in larger corporate retailers into communities, 
under the assumption that these large businesses will produce more tax revenue, better 
retail options for residents, and more jobs.   This study shows that some of these promises 
of growth may not be realized after stores are built.  Where the long-term impact will not 
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be one of growth, but merely a process of replacing small retailers with a larger retailer, 
government leaders need to be more cautious.    
 
 Among the community leaders attending these meetings, there was not a knee-jerk 
opposition to Wal-Mart or any other big box store moving into Chicago communities. 
Rather, the message they conveyed was that we are a diverse city with diverse needs.  We 
are a city of 77 community areas, many different income groups, and many different 
racial, ethnic, and cultural groups, so one size of development does not fit all.   Given the 
report’s findings, we should not be rushing into economic development strategies with 
the assumption that big stores will always be better for local residents and the city as a 
whole.    
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  1 
The Impact of an Urban Wal-Mart Store on Area Businesses: 
An Evaluation of One Chicago Neighborhood’s Experience 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 Since opening its first store in Bentonville, Arkansas in 1962, Wal-Mart Stores Inc. has 
expanded to more than 3,400 Wal-Mart stores and 550 Sam’s Clubs domestically and has become 
the largest retailer and private employer in the U.S. (Basker, 2007).  Wal-Mart expanded in 
concentric circles from its Bentonville hub through rural, small town, and then suburban and small 
city areas of the south-central, southeast, northeast, and finally western regions of the U.S.  Wal-
Mart has achieved nearly complete coverage of these non-urban markets.  Consequently, large 
inner city areas represent Wal-Mart’s last frontier for virgin expansion in the U.S., and the 
company has embarked on an aggressive effort in this direction.   
 
 However, Wal-Mart’s big city urban expansion plans have roused strong local political 
opposition. As of October 2007, there were only two big-city Wal-Mart’s among the three largest 
cities, one in Los Angeles and one in Chicago (Wal-Mart Store Locator, 2008). New York City has 
not yet allowed any Wal-Mart stores within its city limits (Jones 2007), although the retailer is still 
eager to enter that market (Massey, 2009).  Recently, Wal-Mart has indicated that it is hoping to 
expand across the City of Chicago, starting with a store on the South Side (Bustillo, 2009).  The 
economic policy debates, in Chicago and elsewhere, have centered on Wal-Mart’s impact on local 
jobs and wages, as well as consumer prices and community retail development needs.   
 
 Evaluations of the community development impact of the next phase of the company’s 
continued expansion are necessary to inform efforts by decision makers and community activists to 
respond to Wal-Mart’s employment and investment policies. So far as we know, this is the first 
empirical study of the local economic impact of a Wal-Mart in a large city. As such its conclusions 
should be highly relevant for scholars, public officials, and community activists seeking to 
understand consumer choices and improve economic opportunity for inner city residents.  
 
  2 
Studies of Wal-Mart’s Economic Development Impact 
 
 Kenneth Stone published the earliest and most direct studies of Wal-Mart’s impact on local 
economic development (1998, 1995A).1  Using local retail sales tax data, Stone evaluated the 
impact of Wal-Mart’s growth in small towns in Iowa between 1983 and 1993.  Breaking the data 
down by two-digit SIC code, Stone computed “pull factors” (PF) equal to “per capita sales for a 
community” divided by “per capita sales for the state” in current dollars for different communities 
and industries. He measured percentage changes in these pull factors over time relative to a base 
year – one year before the Wal-Mart opened.  
 
 Stone’s results show clear evidence of a very large localized and specialized Wal-Mart  
impact causing: a) PF declines in all non-General Merchandise sectors except for Home 
Furnishings and Eat and Drink in Wal-Mart towns, b) generally larger PF declines in all retail 
categories with the exception of “Food” (not sold by Wal-Mart during this period) in non-Wal-
Mart towns, c) Across all categories, a five year 6.0 percent increase in the PF for total sales in 
Wal-Mart towns versus a -10.4 percent decline in Non-Wal-Mart towns, d) Larger market share 
losses for non-Wal-Mart towns that were within 20 miles of Wal-Mart towns than for non-Wal-
Mart towns that were farther away, e) An estimated 23 percent decline in the number of retail 
stores in Iowa, based on PF losses by store category and average sales per store by retail category 
in 19932, and f) an overall decline in the value of retail sales, over the 1983 to 1993 period in Iowa 
in addition to this large substitution effect.   
 
 Stone has generalized his work to rural communities (1997) and shown similar results for Wal-
Mart Supercenters in Mississippi (Stone, Artz and Myles 2002). Other regional studies of Wal-
Mart’s impact (all looking at rural areas) have come to similar conclusions (see citations in 
Neumark, Zhang and Ciccarella , 2007).  
 
 One critique made of Stone’s work, and other similar regional studies, is that the “before and 
after” methodology employed does not take possible endogeneity of the location and timing of 
Wal-Mart store openings into account (Neumark, Zhang and Ciccarella, 2007, Basker, 2007). One 
response to this criticism is that it ignores the differential effects of Wal-Mart on merchandise 
categories sold by Wal-mart (“general merchandise” and “department store”) and not sold by Wal-
mart (food).in Stone’s study.  It seems unlikely that these impacts cannot be attributed to an 
“endogenous” effect of Wal-Mart store location.  Stone’s results show that Wal-Mart stores in 
rural areas gain market share at the expense of both other in-town stores and  nearby (up to 20 
miles away in rural Iowa) retail stores.  This results in large market share losses for other stores,  
and a large reduction in the number of retail outlets overall. If the large PF increases found in 
“Wal-Mart towns” and the large declines in “non-Wal-Mart towns” were the result of a very 
successful Wal-Mart site selection process that targeted fast growing retail markets, there is little 
reason to believe high relative growth rates would be confined to the general merchandise and 
department store categories.   
 
                                                 
1
 Stone’s well-known simple and direct analysis is not included in Basker’s (2007) otherwise comprehensive review of 
the literature on the “causes and consequences of Wal-Mart’s growth”.    
2
 Calculated from Table 4, p. 68 (Stone, 1995).  
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 Recent econometric studies using national level data over a 20- to 30-year time period have 
had mixed results.  Some studies corroborate Stone’s analysis by showing retail employment and 
payroll losses in counties where a Wal-Mart opened relative to counties with no Wal-Mart 
(Neumark, Zhang and Ciccarella, 2007 and Dube and Wertheim, 2005), but others show retail and 
wholesale employment gains in these counties (Basker, 2005)3.  All of these studies use time-series 
and spatial regression with an “instrumental variable” that attempts to control for the impact of the 
possible endogenous site selection effect discussed above.  
 
 Two studies done by Neumark, Zhang and Ciccarella (2007) and Dube and Wertheim (2005) 
exploit the pattern of Wal-Mart’s spatial expansion to construct their instrumental variable. 
Neumark, Zhang and Ciccarella (2007) estimate that each new Wal-Mart store reduces county-
level retail employment by about 150 workers so that each Wal-Mart worker replaces about 1.4 
non-Wal-Mart retail workers.  In addition, they determine that a new Wal-Mart reduces county-
level retail earnings by 1.3 percent.  Dube and Wertheim (2005) find that in urban counties with a 
Wal-Mart, the wage bill for workers in the general merchandise and grocery sectors declines by 
1.3 percent, whereas the wage bill in rural (non-MSA) counties with a Wal-Mart does not change.  
 
 In another study, Basker (2005b) finds that the number of retail jobs in a county with a Wal-
Mart store increases by 50 after five years; however, this is partially offset by a 30 worker 
wholesale job decline in these counties over the same period.  Basker (2005) uses planned Wal-
Mart opening dates as an instrumental variable for the timing of Wal-Mart openings in her 
estimations and drops small and historically declining counties from her sample to control site 
location selection bias. She does not find a statistically significant effect in counties that are 
adjacent to Wal-Mart counties.   
 
 In a more recent survey article, Basker (2007) highlights Wal-Mart’s efficiency gains, noting 
that the McKinsey Global Institute estimated in 2001 that Wal-Mart’s real value added per worker 
was more than 40 percent higher than that of other General Merchandise retailers.  This is 
consistent with Neumark, Zhang and Ciccarella’s (2007) finding that every Wal-Mart worker 
replaces at least 1.4 non-Wal-Mart retail workers.  Basker’s (2005) econometric results showing 
employment gains, however, appear inconsistent with the McKinsey study. This finding may be 
due to Basker’s elimination of small and declining counties from her sample and her choice of 
instrumental variable4.   
 
 Dube and Wertheim’s (2005) results are also consistent with Stone’s (1988, 1995) findings that 
the job loss and total wage bill decline as a result of Wal-Mart’s efficiency gains. Both effects 
could be mitigated in urban areas because, in these heavily-developed areas, there are few 
opportunities to draw consumers from nearby cities and towns.  
 
 In this context, we note that since Wal-Mart only sells certain retail commodities, evaluations 
of the welfare impact of Wal-Mart’s overall wage and price effects should not be based on simple 
comparisons of wage and price reductions.  Direct comparisons of wage and price reduction 
                                                 
3
 Sobel and Dean’s (2007) recent study finds that finds that, after controlling for other variables, US states with more 
Wal-Marts did not have a smaller or less profitable small business sector.  
4
 It is unclear why “planned” opening dates should be any less correlated with retail market (and employment) growth 
than “actual” opening dates.  
  4 
estimates such as those made by Basker (2007) can be misleading if they do not take other rising 
costs such as health care, education, housing, and costs of other consumer goods, such as cars and 
gas, into account in assessing actual “real” wage  increase or decrease. 
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The Chicago Wal-Mart Study 
 
 In the spring of 2004, Wal-Mart submitted zoning applications to locate stores in two different 
Chicago neighborhoods.  After a number of highly contentious Zoning Board and City Council 
meetings, Wal-Mart was given approval for a store on Chicago’s West Side.5  This controversial 
decision was followed by an effort to enact a “big box living wage” ordinance in Chicago that 
would require Wal-Mart and other large retailers to pay a “living wage” and provide health 
benefits (Baiman, 2006). The Big Box Living Wage Ordinance was passed by City Council but 
provoked a heated debate and led to the first Mayoral veto in 17 years.  The new Wal-Mart opened 
at the end of September 2006. At present Wal-Mart is considering opening a number of other 
outlets in the city of Chicago.  
  
 The goal of our study is to evaluate the local employment, wage, and sales impact of a Wal-
Mart store in an inner-city area.   In an urban context, unlike a rural or suburban setting, a Wal-
Mart store has limited ability to attract customers from outside the political jurisdiction where it is 
located because there are many alternative retailers.  We therefore expect much of the retail 
spending going to a Wal-Mart store to replace spending that would have otherwise gone to stores 
in the neighborhood.  
 
 A Wal-Mart store has a higher sales-to-employee ratio than the smaller stores whose customers 
it attracts. This means that it may employ fewer workers to sell merchandise that would otherwise 
be sold by less efficient stores.  The result is that Wal-Mart may reduce, rather than increase, local 
retail employment.   
 
 
                                                 
5
 The exact location of the store is 4650 W. North Ave, Chicago IL 60639. 
  6 
Methodology  
 
 In order to study the effect of Wal-Mart on economic activity in the West Side neighborhood 
where it is located, we gathered baseline (“pre-Wal-Mart”) information and measure post-Wal-
Mart changes in activity over two years.  We attribute changes in economic activity to Wal-Mart’s 
presence by comparing (1) pre-Wal-Mart activity and trends to post-Wal-Mart activity and trends, 
(2) changes in activity near Wal-Mart to changes further away and (3) changes in product lines that 
directly compete with Wal-Mart to those that do not.  We use a variety of data to make these 
comparisons. 
 
Survey Data 
 
 We obtained our main source of data about business activity in the neighborhood of the new 
Wal-Mart store by conducting a series of phone surveys of local businesses.6  Figure 1 outlines the 
three waves of surveying and associated follow up investigations. Using geographically coded 
MSN Yellow Pages listings for retail stores, we assembled a list of 503 businesses in the major 
retail categories that compete with Wal-Mart.  Our target area covered businesses within a four-
mile radius of Wal-Mart, and in an area roughly bounded by Irving Park Avenue to the north, 
Western Avenue on the east, Roosevelt Avenue on the south, and Harlem Avenue on the west.   
From March through late August 2006, we implemented our telephone survey and were able to 
obtain baseline (pre-Wal-Mart opening) data on the number of hours worked by owners and 
employees, number of employees, starting and average wages, whether benefits are offered, and 
some prices.  
 
 In early summer 2006, we began supplementing our phone surveys with on-site visits to 
businesses that had not responded by telephone. We particularly concentrated on stores in the 
“Washington Square Mall” located only one block away from the new Wal-Mart.  At the very 
least, these in-person visits allowed us to collect price data even if businesses did not respond to 
our other questions. In an effort to get a wider array of stores and more pricing information we 
expanded our original sample of general merchandise store, discount store, apparel stores, drug  
stores, and hardware stores, to include baby and infant stores, electronic stores, toy stores, shoe 
stores, and office supply stores. By the end of our first survey period, we obtained 191 unique 
completed surveys of which 177 were verified as in the survey area.   
 
 Beginning in March 2007, we re-surveyed those stores that completed surveys in 2006.   Again 
these were mostly telephone surveys, involving multiple calls to the same store until someone 
answered or explicitly asked not to be contacted again, followed by a few site visits.   This second 
                                                 
6
 We originally considered conducting a quasi-experimental study, to compare the West Side Wal-Mart neighborhood 
to a similar Chicago neighborhood without a Wal-Mart.  After an intensive effort to find a “control” region within the 
City of Chicago, we concluded that no other area of the city could serve as an appropriate control, because no other 
area had experienced such a large recent decline in retail and overall employment in recent years.  We therefore 
elected to survey a larger “target” area as than we had originally anticipated. This methodological change was based 
on an a judgment that spatial regression techniques that attempt to capture patterns of employment, property value, 
wage, and price, change as distance from the Wal-Mart increases, would better control for Wal-Mart’s effects than a 
survey of a completely different area in the city. 
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wave of surveying continued through early November 2007, when surveying was discontinued to 
avoid the potential that holiday seasonal employment could distort employment data..    
 
 Our third wave of data collection began in March 2008 and ran through early November 2008.   
 
 In addition to the basic sample followed forward, the ongoing status (i.e. in business/out of 
business) of the initial stores as of 2007 and 2008 was established.  In addition to the initial 177 
interviewed stores, 136 stores were followed in this manner of which 129 stores were verified as in 
the survey area.  This yields a sample of 306 (177+129) retail establishments for which line of 
business and ongoing status as of 2006, 2007 and 2008 are known. 
 
 
Other Sources of Information about Wal-Mart’s Impact 
 
1. Sales tax data by zip code 
We obtained zip code-level data on taxable sales from the Illinois Department of Revenue (IDOR), 
by quarter, from the first calendar quarter of 2000 through the third quarter of 2008.  The dataset 
included the zip code in which Wal-Mart is located, 60639, and nine surrounding zip codes.  We 
analyze these data to determine whether Wal-Mart has increased taxable sales in its own zip code 
and/or suppressed taxable sales in nearby zip codes. 
 
2. Employment data from Illinois Department of Employment Services (IDES).  Through its 
operation of the state’s unemployment compensation system, the IDES collects detailed data about 
employment, total earnings and other aspects of firm operation at the establishment level.  The 
IDES publishes some aggregations of data about total employment by zip code and industry for 
March of each year.  We have constructed a data set about employment by retail firms in the Wal-
Mart neighborhood based on this publicly released annual data through March 2008.  
 
3. We attempted a qualitative study of Wal-Mart’s small “Jobs and Opportunity Zones” program 
which was designed to aid area businesses.  Our research and findings about this program are 
discussed in the Appendix 1 
 
4. Finally in appendix 2 we present information on our analysis of Dun and Bradstreet data.    
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Findings from Survey Data  
 
2006 Baseline Survey and Response Rate  
 
 We had a total of 503 retail businesses in our original “universe.”   In our first round of calling 
in 2006 (baseline data collection), we completed surveys of 191 unique businesses for a response 
rate of about 38 percent.  177 of these were verified as in the sample area.  Descriptive information 
about some our findings from the first survey are contained in Table 1.       
 
 On average, the firms we surveyed in 2006 had about ten employees and paid a wage of $8.08 
per hour.  Fifty-one of the firms reported offering health care coverage to their employees.  About 
half were owned by Chicagoans while the rest had dispersed ownership.  Many of the businesses 
had owners that worked directly in the store for many hours (an average of almost 49) each week.  
Many of the businesses had women or minority owners. 
 
 As part of our survey, we asked each business to indicate the product lines in which they 
operated.  All businesses in our survey had product lines that overlapped with Wal-Mart’s.  Many 
businesses carried multiple product lines – among the most popular were apparel (48 percent) and 
drugs (31 percent).  We also geo-coded the location of all the stores in our sample and measured 
the distance from each business to Wal-Mart.  Businesses ranged from as little as one-tenth of a 
mile from Wal-Mart to as far as four miles from Wal-Mart with the average business about two 
and one-third miles from Wal-Mart. 
 
 2007 Survey Response Rate  
 
 In our 2007 survey, we were able to complete repeat surveys for 98 of the original 177 area 
businesses, for a 2007 repeat-survey response rate of about 55 percent.   As shown in Table 2, 
about one-third (32 percent) of the 177 businesses we originally surveyed refused to participate a 
second time.  In addition we conclude that 22 businesses went out-of-business sometime between 
our 2006 survey and our 2007 survey attempt.   These included nine businesses that had 
disconnected phone numbers, six businesses that had become different stores since 2006, and 
seven businesses that completed surveys in 2006 but that we were unable to contact despite 
repeated attempts in 2007.   
 
 
2008 Survey Response Rate  
 
 For part A of our 2008 survey, we attempted to contact all the 155 businesses in the 2007 
sample which had not yet gone out of business (i.e. 155=177-22).  We were able to complete 
repeat surveys for 80 of these, for a 2008 repeat-survey response rate of about 52 percent.   As 
shown in Table 2, 58 of the businesses we resurveyed refused to participate in the 2008 survey.  In 
addition we conclude that 24 businesses went out-of-business sometime between our 2007 survey 
and our 2008 survey attempt.   These included 17 businesses that had disconnected phone 
numbers, two businesses that had become different stores since 2006, and seven businesses that 
completed surveys in 2006 but that we were unable to contact despite many repeated attempts in 
2008. 
  9 
 
 Part B of the 2008 survey, generates an additional sample of 129 businesses that were in the 
original 2006 sampling universe of 503 retail businesses and in the sample area, but never before 
contacted.  For these businesses, we were able to ascertain only whether they were in business as 
of 2007 and 2008 and in what line of goods they specialized. For firm survival this means a total 
sample of 306 (306=177+129; see Figure 1).   
 
 The top of Table 3 contains some summary statistics about businesses that responded to both 
the 2006 and 2007 surveys.  On average, these businesses had about ten employees and had 14 
percent more employees in 2007 than they had in 2006.  The firms paid an average wage of $8.47 
per hour, which was about four percent higher than the average wage they reported in the 2006 
survey.  
 
 The bottom of Table 3 shows the same statistics for businesses that responded to both the 2007 
and 2008 surveys.  These businesses had 12.4 full-time equivalent employees in 2008, a fall on 
average of about 5 percent since 2007.7  Wage movements between 2007 and 2008 are small, 
going from $8.66 to $9.02 or a 4.0 percent increase.8   
 
Distance from Wal-Mart and Retail Closures  
 
 Figure 2 plots the location of the 306 businesses in the overall survival sample relative to Wal-
Mart and identifies those that went out of businesses between 2006 and 2008. Table 4 presents 
evidence on the probability of going out of business by geographic relation to Wal-Mart in tabular 
form.  Although there is some variance in the rate at which firms went out-of-business across 
quadrants—from a high of 29.5 percent in the northeast quadrant to a low of 22.4 percent in the 
southwest—the differences are not statistically significant. 
 
 Table 5 reports on several regression specifications that test the hypothesis that proximity to 
Wal-Mart influences the probability a competing business will fail.  Column (1) reports the results 
of a simple ordinary least squares regression of distance to Wal-Mart (in miles) on a dummy 
variable that equals one if the respondent business closed between our 2006 and 2007 surveys. The 
constant suggests that in the immediate vicinity of the Wal-Mart location about 25 percent of 
competing businesses closed in this first year.   The negative and significant coefficient indicates 
that each one-mile increase in distance to Wal-Mart reduced the probability of closing by about 
four percent.  Thus at three miles, a competing business had only a 13 percent chance of closing in 
that year.  The ordinary least squares regression in column (3) suggests that these effects continued 
at much the same pace in the second year of the 2006-2008.  A business in the immediate 
proximity of Wal-Mart had about a 40 percent chance of closing some time over the two year 
period.  This chance fell at a significant rate of almost 6 percent per mile.  Thus at three miles, a 
competing business had only a 22 percent chance of closing in the two year period.  Columns (2) 
and (4) replicate columns (1) and (2) using the probit functional form to constrain the predicted 
probability to be between zero and one. The results of these tests essentially replicate the simpler 
                                                 
7
 The small sample (29 retailers) for which employment figures are available for all three years show modest declines 
from 9.5 full-time equivalents in 2006 to 8.8 in 2008. 
8
 The small sample with wage rates for each of the three years (11 retailers) shows a small decrease from $8.85 to 
$8.55, 3.4 percent. 
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forms in columns (1) and (2).  Column (5) shows results when the sample is limited to three miles.  
For this smaller sample, the coefficient on the distance parameter is consistent with the other 
estimates.  
 
 The general decline of closures with distance from Wal-Mart seems independent of direction.  
None of the simple models of business closure is significantly altered by the introduction of 
quadrant variables.  Similarly, base-year employment fails to enter the regression as significant.  
Including this variable leaves distance insignificant as well.     
 
 Table 6 breaks down the going-out-of-business regression (2006-2008) by retail line of 
business.  All of these lines show negative distance effects and for a majority these effects are 
statistically significant.  The largest distance effect is found for toy stores at 25 percent per mile.  
A hypothetical toy store adjacent to Wal-Mart had a 75 percent chance of going out of business.  A 
toy store three miles away had almost no chance.  A similarly large impact was found for 
electronics stores, starting at 62 percent and falling off 22 percent per mile.  Office supply stores 
had much the same pattern.         
 
Estimated Job Loss from Wal-Mart 
 
 Business closures generated by a Wal-Mart “distance effect” result not only in losses to 
business owners, but also in declines in employment that would not otherwise have occurred.  An 
estimate of these employment declines builds from the basic linear equation in Table 5 restricted to 
establishments within four miles of Wal-Mart (Column 1, Table 5a).  The expected employment 
loss for each establishment is estimated as regression coefficient  × (4 - distance from Wal-Mart)  
× (average employment in 2006 of establishments that closed by 2008).  Average employment of 
the sampled establishments that closed by 2008 was 6.05 full-time equivalent workers.  This gives 
an estimate of 189 full-time equivalent jobs lost through the Wal-Mart effect on the 306 sampled 
stores.  If we adjust this estimate for stores which were never contacted (482/306), the estimated 
loss increases to 298.   
 
 With some adjustments, the job-loss figures estimated here can be compared to the assertion 
that Wal-Mart employed some 426 workers at its Chicago store, 310 of whom were “sales 
associates.”(Mitts, 2008)  Many of the latter were undoubtedly part-time workers.  An estimate of 
about 320 full-time equivalent workers (assuming half the 426 workers were part-time) would very 
likely be generous.         
 
 Table 7 reports on additional regressions with dependent variables that measure the change in 
employment and wages in surviving stores that responded to both the 2006 and 2007 surveys and 
surviving stores that responded to both the 2006 and 2008 survey.  Distance to Wal-Mart was not 
significantly correlated with either of these variables in either sample. 
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Summary: 
 
 In our data we find evidence that proximity to Wal-Mart was correlated with the probability 
that businesses closed during the first and second years of Wal-Mart’s operation.  The observed 
effect grows over the two years suggesting that it is persistent and more significant than the first 
year data of the preliminary report suggested.    Rough comparisons of employment losses 
associated with Wal-Mart’s opening and Wal-Mart’s own labor force suggest that Wal-Mart had 
little or no net effect on total employment in the area.   
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Findings from Sales Tax Data 
 
 We obtained quarterly data about taxable sales for the zip codes mapped in Figure 4 from 
calendar quarter 1 of 2000 through calendar quarter 2 of 2009, but we only use data through 
quarter 2 of 2008 to avoid confounding trends with the financial crisis that began in September of 
that year.  These data were provided by the Illinois Department of Revenue.  As noted on the map, 
the Wal-Mart store lies in zip code 60639 just across the border from zip code 60651.  In 2005, zip 
code 60639 had taxable sales of about $743 million.  These sales were growing at a healthy 7.5 
percent per year before the opening of Wal-Mart.  We do not have data on the annual sales of the 
Chicago Wal-Mart, but according to the “Two-Year Economic Report Card” (Mitts, 2008) on the 
impact of the Wal-Mart store issued by Alderman Emma Mitts, Wal-Mart paid $10.4 million in 
sales taxes (all levels) in its first two years of operations.  This figure implies sales of at least $55 
million per year.9  Alternatively, we know that, according to Wikinvest (2008), in 2005 US sales 
by Wal-Mart averaged $438 per square foot. Since Chicago’s Wal-Mart is 142,000 square feet 
(Jones 2008), we might expect its sales to be about to be about $61 million dollars per year.  Using 
a figure of $60 million, these sales amount to about eight percent of the sales in the zip code.   
 Table 8 reports the results of some simple regressions that attempt to measure the impact of 
Wal-Mart’s opening on total sales in zip code 60639.  In these regressions the dependent variable 
is the natural log of taxable sales measured in millions (i.e. 100*sales taxes/1,000,000).  In Model 
1_1 and 1_2 the sample is restricted to the period prior to Wal-Mart’s opening in the third quarter 
of 2006.  Independent variables in Model 1 include dummy variables for each quarter and a zip 
code specific intercept and a variable that denotes the year.  The coefficients on the quarter 
dummies show that sales are highest in the second and fourth quarters and somewhat lower in the 
third and (omitted) first quarter.  The coefficient on year implies that, when all else is equal, sales 
in the average zip code of the area grew at about 0.5 percent per year, but this trend was not 
significant.  The model explains 96 percent of the variation in sales across zip codes over time.  
Model 2 generalizes the specification by including variables that interact between zip code and 
year so that each zip code is allowed to have its own rate of growth over time.  The excluded zip 
code is 60639 where Wal-Mart is located so that the coefficient on year (7.4 percent) can be 
interpreted as the yearly growth in sales in that zip code—this is 7.4 percent. 
 
 Model 1_3 uses data from the entire period (first quarter 2000 through first quarter 2008) and 
includes a variable that allows a break-in-trend for the Wal-Mart zip code in the period after it 
opened (third quarter of 2006 through first quarter 2008) and zero otherwise.  This “Wal-Mart 
dummy” should reflect any break-in-trend in sales growth in zip code 60639 after Wal-Mart 
opened.  The estimated break-in-trend amounts to -9.6 percent. The negative coefficient on the 
break-in-trend for Wal-Mart’s home zip code is a bit puzzling (since we expected sales to rise in 
this zip code).  This coefficient is not significantly different from zero.  However, its magnitude is 
larger than Wal-mart’s home zip code trend growth rate.  After Wal-Mart opened, growth in zip 
code 60639 fell to about zero.  Rather than launching a new wave of retail development in its zip 
code, Wal-Mart’s opening coincides with a stagnation of retail growth in that zip code.   
 
                                                 
9
 The calculation here assumes the full tax rate of 9.25 percent until July 2008 and 10.25 percent after that.  Many 
items sold at Wal-Mart qualify for lower tax rates.  Hence the actual sales are undoubtedly higher. 
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 Table 9 reports on more general regressions that allow each zip code to have its own Wal-Mart 
dummy and thus do not impose the assumption that Wal-Mart had no impact on sales in 
surrounding zip codes.  Model 2_post 1999, the regression reported in column 1, uses all of the 
data.  In this regression, nine zip codes in addition to 60639 show estimated negative break-in-
trends, but none of these are significant statistically.  Two zip codes, 60304 and 60612 show 
positive breaks-in-trend, both of which are significant (at the 1 percent and 5 percent level 
respectively.)  There is not an obvious reason why these two zip codes should respond to the Wal-
Mart opening in this fashion.  These two zip codes are both relatively distant from Wal-Mart. 
 
 We reran the same regression excluding data from 2000, 2001 and 2002 to abstract from the 
recession that hit the nation (and the area) beginning in early 2001.  These results are reported as 
Model 2_post2002 in column 2 of Table 9.  When we do this the adjusted R-square rises slightly, 
the negative coefficient on the Wal-Mart home break-in-trend is now significant at better than the 
1 percent level.  Nine other zip codes continue to show a negative break-in-trend, with three of 
these now significant, 60618, 60651, and 70707.  Of the five positive signs only 60301 is now 
significant.  
 
 The regressions in columns 3 and 4 of Table 9 further trim the sample by excluding 
observations from 2003 and 2004, respectively.  The last of these is perhaps the best measure of 
the impact of Wal-Mart’s opening on taxable retail sales.  It compares each zip code’s retail sales 
growth in the year and a half before Wal-Mart’s opening to that zip code’s growth in the year and a 
half after Wal-Mart’s opening.  When this is done the coefficient on Wal-Mart’s home zip code’s 
break-in-trend variable remains negative and highly significant.  There are no significant positive 
breaks-in-trend for this last model and four non-home zip codes retain highly significant negative 
breaks-in-trend.10  
 
 Summary:  Our analyses of data on taxable sales in Wal-Mart’s home and adjacent zip codes 
are consistent with the hypothesis that Wal-Mart’s sales displace a significant amount of sales 
from its home zip code.  Sales in zip code 60639 remained flat despite Wal-Mart’s opening.  There 
is also some evidence that Wal-Mart’s sales reduced sales in some nearby  zip codes, but this 
effect seems to be inconsistent.   
 
                                                 
10
 If we extend the sample of this last model up through the second quarter of 2009, virtually all the zip codes show a 
negative break-in-trend, but these results are very likely influenced by the severity of the recession after the third 
quarter of 2008.   
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Findings from Retail Employment Data 
 
 Tables 10 and 11 follow the analytical approach of Tables 8 and 9, but applied to annual retail 
employment data not quarterly sales tax data.  The dependent variable of Table 10 is the natural 
log of March retail employment for zip code and year.  In Model 1 and 2 the sample is restricted to 
the years prior to Wal-Mart’s opening in the third quarter of 2006, i.e. the March observations for 
2001 through 2006.  Independent variables in Model 1 include a zip code specific intercept and a 
variable that denotes the year.  The coefficient on year implies that, all else equal retail 
employment grew at about 4.9 percent per year.  The model explains 93 percent of the variation in 
employment across zip codes over time.  Model 2 generalizes the specification by including 
variables that interact between zip code and year so that each zip code is allowed to have its own 
rate of growth over time.  For zip code 60639 where Wal-Mart is located the coefficient on year is 
0.33  percent and not significantly different from zero. 
 
 Model 3 uses data from the entire period (2001 through 2008) and includes a break-in-trend 
variable that equals t-6 in the Wal-Mart zip code in the period after it opened and zero otherwise.  
This “Wal-Mart dummy” should reflect any jump in employment growth in this zip code after 
Wal-Mart opened.  The estimated coefficient is +9.5 percent.  However, it is not significant at the 
10 percent level with a t-statistic of 0.87.  A 95 percent confidence interval on the estimated 
coefficient ranges from -12.4 percent to +31.4 percent, meaning we cannot reject the hypothesis 
that Wal-Mart had no effect on total employment growth in its zip code.   
 
 Table 11 reports on more general regressions that allow a break-in-trend Wal-Mart dummy on 
Wal-Mart’s zip code and a similar dummy for all other zip codes aggregated together.  Here (in 
column 1) the home Wal-Mart dummy stays the same and the neighboring Wal-Mart dummy  
comes in at  -5.0 percent, but also short of significance at the 10 percent level (t=1.45).  
Unfortunately, since we do not have quarterly employment data we do not have enough 
observations to estimate separate break-in-trend coefficients for each non-Wal-Mart zip code. 11    
 
 We reran the same regressions excluding data from 2001 and 2002 to abstract from the 
recession that hit the nation (and the area) beginning in early 2001.  These results are reported in 
column 2 of Table 11.  When we do this, the coefficient of the home zip code break-in-trend 
dummy is essentially zero (actually it goes a slight bit negative).  The coefficient on the aggregate 
dummy for neighboring zip codes increases absolutely to -8.2 percent and is significant at the 10 
percent level.   
 
 Summary:  Our analyses of data on retail employment in Wal-Mart’s home and adjacent zip 
codes are consistent with the hypothesis that Wal-Mart’s sales displace some employment from its 
home zip code.  There is also evidence that Wal-Mart’s presence reduced employment in some 
nearby zip codes.   
 
                                                 
11
 Alternatively we might define the Wal-Mart dummies not as permanent effects on trend growth but as one time 
shifts in the intercepts.  This approach gives much the same results as reported above. Here if a Wal-Mart level 
dummy is introduced just for the home zip code, it comes in with a coefficient of 25.1 percent, but not significant at 
the 10 percent level (t=1.41).  Adding a Wal-Mart level dummy for neighbors as a group gives a coefficient of -7.2 
percent but again not significant (t=-1.29).   
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Summary and Conclusions 
 
 Our study of Chicago’s West Side Wal-Mart has provided evidence that, in an urban setting, 
proximity to Wal-Mart is associated with a higher probability of going out of business for local 
retail establishments.  In addition, we have some evidence that the West Side Wal-Mart has 
replaced sales and employment from its own and neighboring zip codes.  All of these findings, 
however, show modest, but significant effects.    
 
 Our first two years of survey data produced statistically weak and inconsistent results linking 
distance to Wal-Mart with likelihood of going out of business during Wal-Mart’s first year of 
operation.   However, our second round of surveys began only six months after Wal-Mart’s 
opening so that we capture only short-run effects.   Our third round of surveys began in March 
2008.  Those data provide stronger evidence about Wal-Mart’s long-run effects.  The impact on 
store closures by distance from Wal-Mart is larger and more significant in this last sample.  Our 
estimates suggest that Wal-Mart has resulted in the loss of about 300 full-time-equivalent jobs in 
its own and nearby zip codes.  While there is still considerable uncertainty attached to these 
calculations, they suggest a loss about equal to Wal-Mart’s own employment in the area.  These 
estimates support the contention that large-city Wal-Marts absorb retail sales from other city stores 
without significantly expanding the market.   
 
 The above estimate focuses only on store closings.  Of course, some new stores have entered 
the area since Wal-Mart opened.  We do not have estimates on these store openings.  We simply 
do not know their geographic pattern. In any case, we have no reason to expect them to offset the 
effects on closures documented here.        
 
 Sales tax data from the Illinois Department of Revenue suggest that Wal-Mart’s sales displace 
sales from businesses within the same zip code.  However, our findings with these data showed 
small and inconsistent effects, so we cannot at this time say definitively that Wal-Mart caused a 
reduction in sales in adjacent zip codes.    
 
 Illinois Department of Employment Security data on retail employment in Wal-Mart’s own zip 
code and nearby zip codes are largely consistent with our survey findings.  Retail employment 
levels in Wal-Mart’s own zip code rise modestly (presumably because of Wal-Mart own 
employees), but retail employment trends in neighboring zip codes show a negative effect after 
Wal-Mart’s opening.  These findings like those from our survey are consistent with but somewhat 
more muted than findings by Neumark, Zhang, and Ciccarella (2007) which suggest that nationally 
every Wal-Mart worker replaces about 1.4 non-Wal-Mart workers.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Jobs and Opportunity Zones 
 
 On April 2006, Wal-Mart CEO, Lee Scott, announced that the new Wal-Mart store in the West 
Side of Chicago would be the first of ten sites to adopt an initiative called “Jobs and Opportunity 
Zones.”  According to the original article on Wal-Mart’s website, this initiative was designed to 
help the economy in poor neighborhoods thrive by accomplishing several things. (Wal-Mart 
Stores, 2006)   First, through the “Small Business Spotlight”, five small local businesses would be 
chosen each quarter to be featured in advertisements in both local newspapers and Wal-Mart’s in-
store radio network.  Business owners would receive a “Wal-Mart Trend Report” and would be 
able to attend seminars held by Wal-Mart’s Business Development Team on how to thrive with a 
Wal-Mart nearby (ReclaimingDemocracy.org, 2008).  Finally, a grant of $300,000 would be 
donated to different local chambers of commerce and Wal-Mart would work with them to create 
effective programs for the funds.12 
 
 After Mr. Scott’s first announcement, Wal-Mart released very little information about the Jobs 
and Opportunity Zones Initiative.  We made several attempts to contact Daphne Davis-Moore, 
Wal-Mart’s Community Affairs Manager, and Camille Lilly, President of the Austin Chamber of 
Commerce through telephone calls, emails, and formal letters to find more information.  However, 
we were unable to obtain even basic information beyond the list of businesses chosen for the 
“Small Business Spotlight”. 
 
 According to a Chicago Tribune article, the Illinois Hispanic Chamber of Commerce (IHCC) 
received $75,000 out of the grant Wal-Mart gave (Jones, 2007).  Omar Duque, president/CEO of 
the IHCC, commented during a phone interview that the projects they were working on in relation 
to Wal-Mart focused on taking advantage of the higher traffic of customers going through the area 
due to Wal-Mart’s presence.  He was unable to describe a specific program or project implemented 
with the Wal-Mart grant since he had not been directly involved. We are currently in the process of 
trying to contact someone at IHCC who can provide more information. 
 
 Representatives from two of the five original businesses chosen to be part of the “Small 
Business Spotlight” program also were contacted. In phone interviews both Curlie Anderson from 
Curlie’s Bakery and Norman Delrahim from B & S Hardware, Anderson and Delrahim confirmed 
that Wal-Mart published ads for their businesses in local newspapers, but neither was able to 
confirm that there were radio ads in Wal-Mart’s network.  Neither attended a seminar on how to 
thrive with a Wal-Mart nearby, and Delrahim added that Wal-Mart was no longer planning to hold 
seminars.  Curlie Anderson reported feeling disappointed at the results and said, “This initiative 
was pretty much a failure.”  Anderson believed however, that Wal-Mart was not to blame for this 
failure since they did their part. Rather, Anderson blamed the local chambers of commerce for 
taking Wal-Mart’s money but not using it to help the small businesses.  The local chambers of 
                                                 
12
 The original figure given in the article that first announced the initiative on Wal-Mart’s website (Wal-Mart Stores, 
April 2006) was $500,000, but nine months later the figure had dropped to $300,000 (McCain, 2007) and Wal-Mart’s 
original press release was  no longer available on its website. The press release can still be found in the Reclaiming 
Democracy website at http://reclaimdemocracy.org/walmart/2006/opportunity_zones.php. 
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commerce offered Anderson and Delrahim an opportunity to use Wal-Mart funds to hire high 
school students, but both business owners turned down the offer since they needed more skilled 
workers. (Jones, 2007) 
 
 JMX Media Group is one of the five businesses that were chosen for the second quarter of 
2007 for the ‘Small Business Spotlight’ program (Jones, 2007). In a telephone interview, the 
owner of this business, Sid Daniels, stated that he saw ads for his business in the newspaper and 
heard them on the radio.  He believed the seminars were held, but he was unable to attend. Like the 
other business owners, he did not work with any of the local chambers of commerce. 
 
 Several attempts have been made to contact the other three businesses from original five 
chosen for the “Small Business Spotlight.”  The telephone number available for Dandridge 
Hardware Center has been disconnected. The number for Dreambags works but there has been no 
response from them since the first attempt to contact them on September 2007   Finally, Active 
Auto Parts owner Chris Prayer has not been available to answer our questions and has repeatedly 
asked us to call back later.  
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Appendix 2 
 
Analyses of D&B data 
 
 This appendix reports on our analyses of the D&B data.  This data appears to suffer from 
(sometimes severe) measurement error.   We purchased data from Dun and Bradstreet to 
supplement our survey data.  Dun and Bradstreet (D&B) data provides basic information about 
each establishment’s location, line of business, number of employees and sales and is reputed to 
cover the universe of businesses in a given geographical area.  In our conversations with vendors, 
we were told that D&B updates the files on a monthly basis but, as we discuss below, we have 
reason to believe that these updates may not always take place or may be quite cursory in some 
cases.  We extracted D&B data for December 2005 (about 9 months before the Wal-Mart store 
opened) and December 2007 (about 15 months after the store opened).  We extracted data on all 
retail businesses (1 digit SIC code 5) within a three mile radius of zip codes 60639 and 60651 (the 
Wal-Mart sits on the border of these two zip codes).  
 
 According to the D&B data we received, Wal-Mart operates in the SIC code for department 
stores (5311) and has 400 employees.  (The Wal-Mart establishment was excluded from other 
calculations using the D&B data.) According to the D&B data, there were twelve stores within five 
miles employing 1336 people in the 5311 SIC code in December of 2005, which indicates that 
Wal-Mart’s presence was a very significant factor in this industry and neighborhood.    
 
 Every firm in the D&B data has a primary four-digit SIC code which describes the main 
products sold in the establishment.  We examined these codes and designated each establishment 
as selling a product that either competed or did not compete with Wal-Mart13.  Of course, there 
were many establishments that were not in Wal-Mart’s four-digit SIC code but competed in one or 
more of Wal-Mart’s product lines.  Based on the D&B data there were 175 establishments 
employing 959 people that competed with Wal-Mart within one mile of the store’s location in 
December 2005.  There were an additional 478 establishments employing 2715 people within two 
miles of Wal-Mart.  Thus, Wal-Mart was clearly an important presence in this neighborhood and 
market but perhaps not so large that it threatened to completely transform the market place. 
 
 We divided the businesses in the D&B data into three groups:  those that appeared in the 2005 
data but not in the 2007 data, those that appeared in the 2007 data but not in the 2005 data, those 
that appeared in both the 2005 and 2007 data.  We extracted a random sample of 20 businesses that 
appeared in the 2005 data but not the 2007 data and attempted to contact  them using the name and 
address information provided by the 2005 D&B data.  We found that at least five of these 
businesses were still operating in February 2008 despite the fact that they did not appear in our 
December 2007 extraction of D&B data.  We also extracted a random sample of 20 businesses that 
appeared in both the 2005 and 2007 D&B data and attempted to contact  them using the name and 
                                                 
13
 Examples of competing SIC codes include Department stores (5311), Men's and Boys' Clothing and Accessory 
Stores (5611), Furniture Stores (5712).  Examples of non-competing SIC codes include Lumber and Other Building 
Materials Dealers (5211), Retail Bakeries (5461), Motor Vehicle Dealers (New and Used) (5511), Musical Instrument 
Stores (5736).  We designated Eating and Drinking Places (5812) as non-competing even though the Wal-Mart store 
does house a fast food restaurant on the theory that this establishment was likely to draw little business from nearby 
restaurants. 
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address information provided by the 2007 data.  In February of 2008 we found that only 11 of the 
20 businesses in this sample were open and operating under the name given in the D&B data.  
Three of the businesses were operating in a similar line of business but under a different name than 
that given in the D&B data.  Despite repeated phone calls we could find no evidence that the other 
six businesses were operating at all. 
 
 We also attempted to compare sales in 2005 to sales in 2007 for businesses that appeared in 
both data sets but found that, for the vast majority of establishments, there was no change in sales.  
Since it is very unlikely that annual sales in 2005 would be exactly the same as annual sales in 
2007, we conclude that either D&B did not ask about sales for these establishments or that D&B 
conducted a only a cursory investigation (e.g. they said, “Are sales still X?”).  Sales amounts 
differed for only 214 of the 2,070 establishments found in both the 2005 and 2007 data.   
 
 Based on these analyses we concluded that the D&B data may provide less than perfect 
indicators of Wal-Mart’s impact on economic activity in that neighborhood.  However, while the 
D&B data surely measure economic activity with error we have no evidence that they provide a 
biased estimate of Wal-Mart’s effect.  We therefore provide a summary of our findings using this 
data here. 
 
 Using the D&B data, we find additional evidence that proximity to Wal-Mart may have 
increased the probability that a businesses closed during the first year of Wal-Mart’s operation.  
This evidence is consistent with and, in fact, stronger than the results from our own survey.  We 
also find some evidence that being in an SIC code that directly competes with Wal-Mart increased 
the probability that area businesses failed. 
 
 In our analyses we assume that businesses that appeared in the 2007 data but not the 2005 data 
were new businesses started after December of 2005.  Table A2.1 shows a cross-tabulation of 
business status (out-of-business, new business, existing business) by two-digit SIC code.  There 
were 3378 (1308+2070) establishments in the 2005 data.  Overall, in this neighborhood, 1308 
firms went out-of-business while only 697 new businesses were started and 2,070 businesses were 
continuing.  Thus, business existence is clearly very transitory in this neighborhood—about one 
out of three businesses in the 2005 survey was not in the 2007 survey.  While there is some 
variance across SIC codes, it is clear that all business lines are quite unstable—at least 24 percent 
of each column have gone out-of-business. 
 
 Table A2.2 shows basic descriptive statistics about the firms in our D&B data.  We have some 
data on sales and employment for the vast majority of establishments in the 2005 data.  In 2005 the 
average firm had almost eight employees and sales of more than $430,000, but the standard 
deviation on both numbers was very large.  Sales and employment were similar in 2007.  The 
average business in the 2005 survey reported that it was 15 years old, which seems hard to 
reconcile with the very rapid rate of business turnover found in the data.  As shown in Table A2.1 
about 17 percent of the business were new in 2007 and about 32 percent of the 2005 businesses 
were out-of-business by 2007.  Sales amounts differed for only 214 of the 2,070 establishments 
found in both the 2005 and 2007 data.  For establishments where the sales figures differed between 
the two years, we calculated the percentage change in employment and sales.  In both cases we see 
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a substantial decline—sales fell by almost 16 percent and employment declined almost eight 
percent. 
 
 Table A2.3 shows business status by compete/non-compete status.  One might imagine that 
establishments that sold a competitive product to Wal-Mart would be more likely to go out-of-
business than those that did not.  The raw data, however, shows no evidence that this is true—38 
percent (538/(538+862)) of the non-competing establishments in the 2005 data were out-of-
business by 2007.  An almost identical percentage (39 percent) of the competing establishments 
were out-of-business.  Similarly, in both non-competitive and competitive SIC codes the number 
of new businesses was equal to about 20 percent of businesses in the 2005 sample.  Thus, the raw 
data contain little evidence that the Wal-Mart store either hastened business failure or slowed 
business formation in competitive SIC codes. 
 
 In parallel with out survey data we examined the geographic distribution of businesses relative 
to the new Wal-Mart store (Table A2.4).  Nearly 70 percent of new businesses formed north of 
Wal-Mart.  This was approximately proportional to the share of continuing and out-of-business 
establishments in the D&B data. 
 
 In Table A2.5A we report results of regression estimates analogous to those reported in Table 5 
but using D&B rather than survey data.  As in our survey data, the OLS regression results in 
column (1) show that the probability an establishment went out-of-business significantly 
diminishes as distance to Wal-Mart increases.  This qualitative result is maintained when we use a 
probit regression specification and add a dummy independent variable that equals 1 if the 
establishment is in a SIC code that competes with Wal-Mart and zero otherwise.  When we add a 
variable that measures employment in 2005 as well (column 4) we get three significant coefficients 
all with intuitive signs.  The probability of an establishment going out-of-business rises with 
proximity to Wal-Mart, being in a competitive SIC code and having fewer employees in 2005.  In 
column 5 we find that establishments with higher sales volumes in 2005 and longer histories are 
also less likely to go out-of-business, although in this specification neither distance to Wal-Mart 
nor being in a competitive SIC codes is a statistical significant determinant of failure. 
 
 In Table A2.5B we expand this regression by adding dummy variables for a number of two-
digit SIC codes.  Distance to Wal-Mart maintains a negative sign but is (barely) insignificant at a 
10 percent confidence level14.  Establishments in several SIC codes (apparel, furniture, and 
miscellaneous) have a particularly high probability of failure. 
 
 We would like to know not only whether Wal-Mart contributed to the failure of some 
businesses but also whether it deterred new businesses from forming.  We cannot run a regression 
analogous to those in Tables A2.5A and A2.5B for new businesses since we only know about 
establishments that came into existence—not those that might have formed but did not.  An 
alternative approach is shown in Table A2.6 where we display the share of new and existing 
establishments by distance from Wal-Mart.  The two distributions are very similar.  In both cases 
ten percent of businesses are within one mile, half of establishments are with-in about 2.3 miles 
and 90 percent of establishments are within 3.7 miles of Wal-Mart.  This raw data provides little 
evidence that Wal-Mart’s existence has, thus far, discourage new business formation. 
                                                 
14
 It is statistically significant at a 10.5 percent confidence level. 
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 Tables A2.7A, A2.7B, A2.8A and A2.8B report results analogous to those in Table 6 using the 
D&B data.  For reasons noted above, we use a sample restricted to establishments that reported 
different sales in the 2005 and 2007 to estimate the determinants of changes in employment and 
sales.  In these regressions, we find few significant variables and little evidence that Wal-Mart’s 
presence had any effect on employment growth or decline among establishments that continued in 
business.  We find some counter-intuitive evidence that establishments in SIC codes that compete 
with Wal-Mart had more growth in sales than those that did not compete with Wal-Mart.  
However, our sample is very limited so we attach little importance to this result. 
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Figure 1: Survey results 2006-2009 
 
             
March 2006 
503 businesses 
identified 
through yellow 
pages search 
By August 2006  
191 completed first survey 
177 confirmed in survey area 
By August 2006 
129 refused to complete first survey but 
known to be in business in survey area 
By August 2006 
 183 unable to contact, inappropriate business 
line or other issue, no survey completed 
By November 2007 
98 confirmed in survey area completed 2nd survey 
22 out of business 
57 refused to complete or ambiguous status 
By November 2008 
80 confirmed in survey area completed 3rd survey 
22 out-of-business by 11/2007 
24 (additional) out-of-business b y 11/2008 
58 refused to complete 3rd survey or ambiguous 
By Spring 2008 
95 known to be in business 
34 known to be out-of business 
 
By Spring 2009 
86  in business 
34 out-of-business by Spring 2008 
9   (additional) out-of-business by Spring 2009 
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Figure 2 
Plot of survey firms by distance and direction to Wal-Mart and out-of-business status 
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Figure 3: Study Area in its larger regional context 
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Figure 4:  Map of zip codes in the Wal-Mart study area 
 
 
 
Note: The data sets for the employment by zip code study does not include 60618, although the survey 
data set and the sales tax data set both include observations from that zip code.   
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics from 2006 Survey 
 
 
Descriptive statistics based on results of the 
2006 survey 
Label 
Number of 
firms with 
valid 
response Mean 
Std. 
Dev.   Min Max 
      
Full-time equivalent employment 111 10.0 14.71 1 112.5 
average wage of retail sales clerks (dollars per hour) 76 8.08 1.96 5 16 
primarily owned by Chicago residents or corporations 
(yes=1, no=0) 168 0.512 0.50 0 1 
ownership shares are widely dispersed (yes=1, no=0) 171 0.43 0.50 0 1 
how many owners work in store 106 1.30 0.60 0 4 
how many hours owners work last week 97 48.88 26.38 0 180 
how many owners are women 102 0.47 0.61 0 2 
how many owners are minorities  102 0.55 0.61 0 2 
starting wage hourly employee (dollars per hour) 106 8.56 5.42 5.5 50 
Store sells apparel (yes=1, no=0) 177 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Store sells home furnishings (yes=1, no=0) 177 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Store sells hardware (yes=1, no=0) 177 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Store sells drugs (yes=1, no=0) 177 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Store sells shoes (yes=1, no=0) 177 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Store sells sporting goods (yes=1, no=0) 177 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Store sells electronics (yes=1, no=0) 177 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Store sells toys (yes=1, no=0) 177 0.08 0.28 0 1 
Store sells children’s clothes (yes=1, no=0) 177 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Store sells general merchandise (yes=1, no=0) 177 0.08 0.28 0 1 
Store sells office supplies (yes=1, no=0) 177 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Store sells videos/music (yes=1, no=0) 177 0.02 0.13 0 1 
Other stores 177 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Distance to Wal-Mart (miles) 177 2.36 1.03 0.14 3.97 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Response Rates for 2007 and 2008 
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Frequency Table on Response 
to 2007 Re-Survey attempt 
Frequency Table on Response 
to 2008 Re-Survey attempt 
outcome of survey attempt 
Number 
of firms Percent Cum. 
Number 
of firms Percent Cum. 
survey completed 98 55.37 55.37 80 49.38 49.38 
refused 57 32.20 87.57 58 35.8 85.19 
phone number disconnected 9 5.08 92.66 16 9.88 95.06 
no response 7 3.95 96.61 7 4.32 98.38 
new/changed business  6 3.39 100 1 0.62 100 
Total 177 100  162 100  
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics from the 2007 and 2008 Surveys 
 
 
 
Descriptive statistics based on results of the 
2007 survey and change from 2006 to 2007 
 Obs  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Full-time equivalent employment 2007 55 
        
10.8    14.40 1 57.5 
Average wage of retail sales clerks (dollars per hour) 28 8.47 2.21 6 15 
Percentage change in employment 2006 to 2007 55 0.14 0.75 -0.57 4.00 
Percentage change in wage 2006 to 2007 28 0.04 0.22 -0.33 0.62 
      
 
Descriptive statistics based on results of the 
2008 survey and change from 2007 to 2008 
Full-time equivalent employment 2008 53 
     
12.37    23.63 1 122.5 
Average wage of retail sales clerks (dollars per hour) 24 9.02 1.27 7.5 11 
Percentage change in employment 2007 to 2008  53 -0.05 0.41 -0.67 1.65 
Percentage change in wage 2007 to 2008 24 0.06    0.17 -0.29 0.375 
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Table 4: 2008 Status of Business by Quadrant 
 
 
 
Status of business by quadrant 
 
In-business 
2008 
Out-of-
business 
2008 Total 
% Out-of-
business 
2008 
Wal-Mart Area 
Quadrant     
northwest 40 14 54 25.93% 
northeast 74 31 105 29.52% 
southeast 44 18 62 29.03% 
southwest 66 19 85 22.35% 
Total 224 82 306 26.80% 
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Table 5: Distance from Wal-Mart and Probability of Going Out of 
Business 
  
  
Probability firm went out of business as a function of 
distance to Wal-Mart and other variables 
  1 2 3 4 5 
  
2006-
2007 
2006-
2007 
2006-
2008 
2006-
2008 
2006-
2008 
Estimation Method OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS 
            
Distance to Wal-Mart (miles)  -0.0412* -0.175* -0.059** -0.179** -.070* 
  -1.89 -1.9 -2.21 -2.2 -1.67 
            
Constant 0.250*** -0.626*** 0.400*** -0.224 0.416*** 
  -4.68 -2.91 -6.17 -1.16 -5.07 
            
Number of observations 306 306 306 306 
222 < 3 
miles 
R-squared 0.008   0.013   0.01 
Psuedo R-squared   0.014   0.014   
            
Absolute t statistics in 
parentheses           
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01           
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Table 6: Probability Firm Went Out of Business between 2006 and 2008 
Surveys as a Function of Distance to Wal-Mart, by Line of Business 
 
 
Distance to 
Wal-Mart 
(miles) 
Constant Number of 
Observations 
R-squared 
Apparel 
  
-0.032 
(0.81) 
0.344*** 
(3.61) 
139 .005 
Home furnishings 
 
-0.153* 
(1.98) 
0.563*** 
(3.47) 
28 0.13 
Hardware 
  
-0.179*** 
(2.87) 
0.512*** 
(4.12) 
41 0.17 
Drugs 
  
-0.192*** 
(4.70) 
0.609*** 
(6.22) 
87 0.21 
Shoes 
  
0.033 
((0.65) 
0.111 
(0.89) 
49 0.01 
Sporting 
 
-0.068 
(0.96) 
0.373** 
(2.31) 
34 0.03 
Electronics 
 
-0.218** 
(2.60) 
0.620*** 
(3.44) 
13 0.38 
Toys 
 
-0.251** 
(2.59) 
0.755*** 
(3.80) 
20 0.27 
Child 
 
-0.145 
(1.30) 
0.554** 
(2.33) 
22 0.08 
General 
 
-0.167** 
(2.43) 
0.546*** 
(3.38) 
39 0.14 
Office 
 
-0.208* 
(1.82) 
0.586*** 
(2.89) 
19 0.16 
Vidmusic 
 
-0.266 
(0.25) 
0.649 
(0.41) 
4 0.03 
Other 
 
-0.067 
(1.15) 
0.446*** 
(3.15) 
78 0.02 
Absolute t statistics in parentheses    
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01    
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Table 7: Percent Change in Employment and Wages as a Function 
of Distance to Wal-Mart 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
% Change Full-
time equivalent 
workers 
2006-2007 
% 
Change 
Wages 
2006-
2007 
% Change 
Full-time 
equivalent 
workers 
2006-2008 
% 
Change 
Wages 
2006-
2008 
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Distance to Wal-Mart (miles) 0.0088 0.0331 
 
0.0493 
 
0.060 
 (0.09) (0.84) (0.78) (1.02) 
Constant 0.114 -0.0320 -0.133 0.068 
 (0.46) (0.32) (0.76) (0.47) 
   
  
Observations 55 28 40 24 
R-squared 0.000 0.03 0.02 0.045 
   
  
Absolute t statistics in parentheses    
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01     
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Table 8: Wal-Mart impact on Taxable Sales in Home 
Zip Code 
 
Model 1_1 Model 1_2 Model 1_3 
 
coef/se coef/se coef/se 
wal_mart_dummy 
 
 -0.096 
 
 
 0.069 
quarter 2 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.077*** 
 0.023 0.017 0.015 
quarter 3 0.008 0.008 0.024 
 0.023 0.018 0.015 
quarter 4 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.101*** 
 0.024 0.018 0.015 
zip code==60301 -1.580*** -0.783*** -0.781*** 
 0.045 0.072 0.062 
zip code==60302 -1.318*** -1.076*** -1.044*** 
 0.045 0.072 0.062 
zip code==60304 -1.955*** -1.669*** -1.740*** 
 0.045 0.072 0.062 
zip code==60305 -1.401*** -1.314*** -1.298*** 
 0.045 0.072 0.062 
zip code==60612 -1.119*** -0.938*** -0.975*** 
 0.045 0.072 0.062 
zip code==60618 0.105** 0.231*** 0.252*** 
 0.045 0.072 0.062 
zip code==60622 0.399*** 0.552*** 0.552*** 
 0.045 0.072 0.062 
zip code==60624 -1.641*** -1.368*** -1.340*** 
 0.045 0.072 0.062 
zip code==60634 -0.679*** -0.474*** -0.461*** 
 0.045 0.072 0.062 
zip code==60641 -0.139*** 0.201*** 0.226*** 
 0.045 0.072 0.062 
zip code==60644 -2.002*** -1.907*** -1.911*** 
 0.045 0.072 0.062 
zip code==60647 0.025 0.176** 0.188*** 
 0.045 0.072 0.062 
zip code==60651 -1.511*** -1.429 -1.397*** 
 0.045 0.072 0.062 
zip code==60707 -0.196 0.248 0.252*** 
 0.045 0.072 0.062 
Year 0.006 0.074*** 0.081*** 
 0.004 0.013 0.011 
Continued on next page… 
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Table 8: Wal-Mart impact on Taxable Sales in Home 
Zip Code, continued 
 
Model 1_1 Model 1_2 Model 1_3 
 
coef/se coef/se coef/se 
zip code==60301*year  -0.236*** -0.239*** 
  0.019 0.014 
zip code==60302*year  -0.072*** -0.085*** 
  0.019 0.014 
zip code==60304*year  -0.085*** -0.057*** 
  0.019 0.014 
zip code==60305*year  -0.026 -0.033*** 
  0.019 0.014 
zip code==60612*year  -0.054*** -0.040*** 
  0.019 0.014 
zip code==60618*year  -0.037** -0.045*** 
  0.019 0.014 
zip code==60622*year  -0.045** -0.046*** 
  0.019 0.014 
zip code==60624*year  -0.081*** -0.092*** 
  0.019 0.014 
zip code==60634*year  -0.061*** -0.066*** 
  0.019 0.014 
zip code==60641*year  -0.101*** -0.110*** 
  0.019 0.014 
zip code==60644*year  -0.028 -0.027* 
  0.019 0.014 
zip code==60647*year  -0.045** -0.050*** 
  0.019 0.014 
zip code==60651*year  -0.024 -0.037*** 
  0.019 0.014 
zip code==60707*year  -0.132*** -0.133*** 
  0.019 0.014 
_cons 4.936*** 4.705*** 4.685*** 
 0.038 0.052 0.047 
Number of observations 390 390 495 
Adjusted R2 0.961 0.976 0.980 
Note:  <0.01 ***; <0.05 - **; <0.1 *; Models 1 and 2 use pre-Wal-Mart data; Model  3 uses 
data from all years; Model 1 assumes growth rate constant across zip codes; Models 2 and 3 
allow growth rates to vary by zip code 
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Table 9: Wal-Mart impact on Taxable Sales all Zip Codes 
 
 
Model 
2_post1999 
Model 
2_post2002 
Model 
2_post2003 
Model 
2_post2004 
 
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
walmart dummy -0.096 -0.229*** -0.191*** -0.184*** 
 0.068 0.078 0.059 0.059 
zip code==60301*year>6.75 0.086 0.344*** 0.395*** -0.061 
 0.068 0.078 0.059 0.059 
zip code==60302*year>6.75 -0.054 -0.065 0.016 0.035 
 0.068 0.078 0.059 0.059 
zip code==60304*year>6.75 0.197*** 0.057 -0.133** -0.191*** 
 0.068 0.078 0.059 0.059 
zip code==60305*year>6.75 0.011 0.042 0.049 0.083 
 0.068 0.078 0.059 0.059 
zip code==60612*year>6.75 0.149** 0.052 0.008 0.011 
 0.068 0.078 0.059 0.059 
zip code==60618*year>6.75 -0.055 -0.207*** -0.090 -0.095 
 0.068 0.078 0.059 0.059 
zip code==60622*year>6.75 -0.006 -0.099 -0.134** -0.141** 
 0.068 0.078 0.059 0.059 
zip code==60624*year>6.75 -0.051 -0.116 -0.073 -0.044 
 0.068 0.078 0.059 0.059 
zip code==60634*year>6.75 -0.024 -0.109 -0.057 -0.093 
 0.068 0.078 0.059 0.059 
zip code==60641*year>6.75 -0.072 -0.113 -0.097 -0.097 
 0.068 0.078 0.059 0.059 
zip code==60644*year>6.75 0.053 -0.057 0.023 0.046 
 0.068 0.078 0.059 0.059 
zip code==60647*year>6.75 -0.001 -0.020 0.003 -0.031 
 0.068 0.078 0.059 0.059 
zip code==60651*year>6.75 -0.089 -0.190** -0.173*** -0.166*** 
 0.068 0.078 0.059 0.059 
zip code==60707*year>6.75 -0.046 -0.227*** -0.230*** -0.282*** 
 0.068 0.078 0.059 0.059 
quarter 2 0.078*** 0.077*** 0.076*** 0.080*** 
 0.015 0.017 0.012 0.010 
quarter 3 0.025* 0.007 0.045*** 0.054*** 
 0.015 0.017 0.012 0.010 
quarter 4 0.102*** 0.079*** 0.074*** 0.086*** 
 0.015 0.017 0.012 0.010 
Continued on next page… 
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Table 9, continued : Wal-Mart impact on Taxable Sales all Zip Codes 
 
 
Model 
2_post1999 
Model 
2_post2002 
Model 
2_post2003 
Model 
2_post2004 
 
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
zip code==60301 -0.758*** 0.124 0.163 -1.806*** 
 0.065 0.173 0.190 0.285 
zip code==60302 -1.058*** -0.768*** -0.611*** -0.560* 
 0.065 0.173 0.190 0.285 
zip code==60304 -1.687*** -1.707*** -2.516*** -2.780*** 
 0.065 0.173 0.190 0.285 
zip code==60305 -1.295*** -0.891*** -1.004*** -0.886*** 
 0.065 0.173 0.190 0.285 
zip code==60612 -0.935*** -0.855*** -1.131*** -1.128*** 
 0.065 0.173 0.190 0.285 
zip code==60618 0.237*** 0.203 0.463** 0.401 
 0.065 0.173 0.190 0.285 
zip code==60622 0.551*** 0.643*** 0.401** 0.329 
 0.065 0.173 0.190 0.285 
zip code==60624 -1.354*** -1.295*** -1.261*** -1.149*** 
 0.065 0.173 0.190 0.285 
zip code==60634 -0.467*** -0.372** -0.322* -0.517* 
 0.065 0.173 0.190 0.285 
zip code==60641 0.207*** 0.407** 0.333* 0.309 
 0.065 0.173 0.190 0.285 
zip code==60644 -1.897*** -1.850*** -1.697*** -1.607*** 
 0.065 0.173 0.190 0.285 
zip code==60647 0.188*** 0.427** 0.383** 0.197 
 0.065 0.173 0.190 0.285 
zip code==60651 -1.421*** -1.350*** -1.411*** -1.406*** 
 0.065 0.173 0.190 0.285 
zip code==60707 0.240*** 0.098 -0.034 -0.292 
 0.065 0.173 0.190 0.285 
Year 0.081*** 0.139*** 0.119*** 0.114*** 
 0.011 0.023 0.024 0.033 
Continued on next page… 
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Table 9, continued : Wal-Mart impact on Taxable Sales all Zip Codes 
 
 
Model 
2_post1999 
Model 
2_post2002 
Model 
2_post2003 
Model 
2_post2004 
 
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
zip code==60301*year -0.247*** -0.414*** -0.421*** -0.105** 
 0.016 0.033 0.034 0.047 
zip code==60302*year -0.079*** -0.133*** -0.159*** -0.167*** 
 0.016 0.033 0.034 0.047 
zip code==60304*year -0.077*** -0.074** 0.061* 0.104** 
 0.016 0.033 0.034 0.047 
zip code==60305*year -0.034** -0.108*** -0.089*** -0.108** 
 0.016 0.033 0.034 0.047 
zip code==60612*year -0.055*** -0.070** -0.024 -0.024 
 0.016 0.033 0.034 0.047 
zip code==60618*year -0.040** -0.033 -0.077** -0.067 
 0.016 0.033 0.034 0.047 
zip code==60622*year -0.0458 -0.062* -0.021 -0.010 
 0.016 0.033 0.034 0.047 
zip code==60624*year -0.087*** -0.104*** -0.109*** -0.126*** 
 0.016 0.033 0.034 0.047 
zip code==60634*year -0.064*** -0.082*** -0.091*** -0.060 
 0.016 0.033 0.034 0.047 
zip code==60641*year -0.103** -0.141*** -0.129*** -0.125*** 
 0.016 0.033 0.034 0.047 
zip code==60644*year -0.033** -0.042 -0.067** -0.081* 
 0.016 0.033 0.034 0.047 
zip code==60647*year -0.050*** -0.096*** -0.088*** -0.059 
 0.016 0.033 0.034 0.047 
zip code==60651*year -0.028* -0.041 -0.031 -0.031 
 0.016 0.033 0.034 0.047 
zip code==60707*year -0.128*** -0.103*** -0.081** -0.040 
 0.016 0.033 0.034 0.047 
_cons 4.685*** 4.384*** 4.494*** 4.518*** 
 0.046 0.123 0.135 0.202 
     
Number of observations 495 315 255 195 
Adjusted R2 0.980 0.984 0.994 0.997 
note:  <0.01 ***; <0.05 - **; <0.1 *; 
    
     
 Note: All models allow growth rate to vary by zip code   
Model 1 uses data from all years, Model 2 uses post 2002 data   
Model 3 use post 2003 data, model 4 use post 2004 data    
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Table 10: Wal-Mart Impact on Retail Employment in 
Home Zip Code 
 
  
Model 1_1 Model 1_2 Model 1_3 
  
coef/se coef/se coef/se 
wal_mart_dummy     0.095 
      (0.110) 
zip code==60612 -1.516*** -2.274*** -2.120*** 
  0.119 0.221 0.186 
zip code==60622 0.257** 0.379* 0.303 
  0.119 0.221 0.186 
zip code==60624 -1.802*** -1.978*** -1.880*** 
  0.119 0.221 0.186 
zip code==60634 -0.636*** -1.236*** -1.049*** 
  0.114 0.204 0.174 
zip code==60641 0.029 0.068 0.137 
  0.114 0.204 0.174 
zip code==60644 -1.473*** -1.502*** -1.515*** 
  0.119 0.221 0.186 
zip code=60647 -0.007 -0.095 -0.090 
  0.114 0.204 0.174 
zip code=60651 -1.581*** -1.597*** -1.615*** 
  0.119 0.221 0.186 
zip code=60707 -1.172*** -1.495*** -1.351*** 
  0.114 0.204 0.174 
Zip code=Oak Park -0.676*** -0.614*** -0.580*** 
  0.114 0.204 0.174 
Year 0.049***     
  0.015     
Continued on next page… 
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Table 10, Continued: Wal-Mart Impact on Retail 
Employment in Home Zip Code 
 
  
Model 1_1 Model 1_2 Model 1_3 
  
coef/se coef/se coef/se 
(zip code==60612)*year   0.206*** 0.165*** 
    0.040 0.024 
(zip code==60622)*year   -0.025 0.008 
    0.040 0.024 
(zip code==60624)*year   0.053 0.029 
    0.040 0.024 
(zip code==60634)*year   0.175*** 0.117*** 
    0.037 0.022 
(zip code==60639)*year   0.003 0.014 
    0.037 0.033 
(zip code==60641)*year   -0.008 -0.023 
    0.037 0.022 
(zip code==60644)*year   0.014 0.028 
    0.040 0.024 
(zip code==60647)*year   0.028 0.035 
    0.037 0.022 
(zip code==60651)*year   0.011 0.025 
    0.040 0.024 
(zip code==60707)*year   0.095** 0.054** 
    0.037 0.022 
(zip code==OakPark)*year   -0.015 -0.017 
    0.037 0.022 
_cons 7.568*** 7.727*** 7.701*** 
  0.096 0.144 0.132 
Number of observations 61 61  83 
Adjusted R2 0.93 0.96  0.96 
note:  <0.01 ***; <0.05 - **; <0.1 *;     
        
 Note: Models 1 and 2 use pre-Wal-Mart data     
Model  3 uses data from all years     
Model 1 assumes growth rate constant across zip 
codes      
Models 2 and 3 allow growth rates to vary by zip 
code  
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Table 11: Wal-Mart Impact on Retail 
Employment in All Zip Codes 
 
  
Model 2_1 Model 2_3 
  
Coef/se coef/se 
wal_mart_dummy 0.095 -0.024 
  0.109 0.090 
non wal_mart_dummy -0.050 -0.082* 
  0.035 0.046 
zip code==60612 -2.157*** -1.670*** 
  0.186 0.232 
zip code==60622 0.266 0.466* 
  0.186 0.232 
zip code==60624 -1.917*** -1.589*** 
  0.186 0.232 
zip code==60634 -1.081*** -0.293 
  0.173 0.232 
zip code==60641 0.105 0.460* 
  0.173 0.232 
zip code==60644 -1.552*** -1.378*** 
  0.186 0.232 
zip code=60647 -0.122 0.124 
  0.173 0.232 
zip code=60651 -1.653*** -1.623*** 
  0.186 0.232 
zip code=60707 -1.384*** -0.915*** 
  0.173 0.232 
Zip code=Oak Park -0.612*** -0.291 
  0.173 0.232 
Continued on next page… 
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Table 11, Continued: Wal-Mart Impact on 
Retail Employment in All Zip Codes 
 
  
Model 2_1 Model 2_3 
  
Coef/se coef/se 
(zip code==60612)*year 0.177*** 0.156*** 
  0.026 0.025 
(zip code==60622)*year 0.020 0.046* 
  0.026 0.025 
(zip code==60624)*year 0.041 0.046* 
  0.026 0.025 
(zip code==60634)*year 0.128*** 0.056** 
  0.023 0.025 
(zip code==60639)*year 0.014 0.086** 
  0.033 0.040 
(zip code==60641)*year -0.012 -0.011 
  0.023 0.025 
(zip code==60644)*year 0.040 0.070*** 
  0.026 0.025 
(zip code==60647)*year 0.047* 0.065** 
  0.023 0.025 
(zip code==60651)*year 0.037 0.091*** 
  0.026 0.025 
(zip code==60707)*year 0.065*** 0.049** 
  0.023 0.025 
(zip code==OakPark)*year -0.006 0.001 
  0.023 0.025 
 
  
  Model 2_1 Model 2_3 
  Coef/se coef/se 
_cons 7.701*** 7.345*** 
  0.1312571 0.189 
  
    
Number of observations 83 66 
Adjusted R2 0.96 0.98 
  
    
  
    
note:  <0.01 ***; <0.05- **;< 
0.1 *; 
    
 Note: Model 2_1 uses all 
years; Model  2_3 uses data 
starting in 2003 
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Appendix Tables 
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able A2.1 Business status by SIC code for Wal-Mart area firms 
Business status by SIC code for Wal-Mart area firms 
Business 
status  
Building 
materials, 
hardware, 
garden 
supply, & 
mobile 
home (SIC 
52) 
General 
merchandise 
stores (SIC 
53) 
Food 
stores 
(SIC 
54) 
Automotive 
dealers 
and 
gasoline 
service 
stations 
(SIC 55) 
Apparel 
and 
accessory 
stores 
(SIC 56) 
Furniture, 
home 
furnishings 
and 
equipment 
stores (SIC 
57) 
Eating 
and 
drinking 
places 
(SIC 
58) 
Miscellaneous 
retail (SIC 59) Total 
In 2005 
survey 
only (out-
of-
business) frequency 32 37 196 89 154 133 363 304 1,308 
 row percentage 2.45 2.83 14.98 6.8 11.77 10.17 27.75 23.24 100 
 column percentage 24.24 27.41 33.11 29.37 33.62 37.46 32.15 31.97 32.1 
In 2007 
survey 
only (new 
business) frequency 21 31 108 39 94 57 194 153 697 
 row percentage 3.01 4.45 15.49 5.6 13.49 8.18 27.83 21.95 100 
 column percentage 15.91 22.96 18.24 12.87 20.52 16.06 17.18 16.09 17.1 
In both 
2005 and 
2007 
survey frequency 79 67 288 175 210 165 572 494 2,070 
 row percentage 3.82 3.24 13.91 8.45 10.14 7.97 27.63 23.86 100 
 column percentage 59.85 49.63 48.65 57.76 45.85 46.48 50.66 51.95 50.8 
Total frequency 132 135 592 303 458 355 1,129 951 4,075 
 row percentage 3.24 3.31 14.53 7.44 11.24 8.71 27.71 23.34 100 
 column percentage 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
  52 
Table A2.2  
Basic Descriptive Statistics about Firms in the Wal-Mart area from the Dun & Bradstreet 
data  
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  
       
Sales volume 2005 
(nominal $s) 2634 434,134 1,961,795 6,000 49,100,000  
Employment here 2005 2944 7.91 23.15 1 476  
Sales volume 2007 
(nominal $s) 2389 
       
441,079  
        
924,549   10,000    9,100,000   
Employment here 2007 2428 8.27 24.31 1 600  
Year Business Started 1853 1990.0 13.14 1895 2005  
New business in 2007 
data 4075 0.17 0.38 0 1  
Out-of-business in 2007 
data 4075 0.32 0.47 0 1  
Distance from Wal-Mart 
(miles) 4075 2.43 1.18 0.07 9.65  
Percentage change in 
employment* 211 -7.8% 65.2% 
-
355.5% 160.9%  
Percentage change in 
sales* 214 -15.8% 89.7% 
-
377.2% 238.6%  
* Restricted to firms with differing sales in 2005 and 2007 surveys. Please see text for discussion. 
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Table A2.3  
Business status by compete status for Wal-Mart area firms* 
Business 
status  
Non-
competitive 
SIC code 
Competitive 
SIC code Total 
In 2005 survey 
only (out-of-
business) frequency 538 770 1308 
 
row 
percentage 41.13 58.87 100 
 
column 
percentage 31.82 32.3 32.1 
In 2007 survey 
only (new 
business) frequency 291 406 697 
 
row 
percentage 41.75 58.25 100 
 
column 
percentage 17.21 17.03 17.1 
In both 2005 
and 2007 
survey frequency 862 1208 2070 
 
row 
percentage 41.64 58.36 100 
 
column 
percentage 50.98 50.67 50.8 
Total frequency 1691 2384 4075 
 
row 
percentage 41.5 58.5 100 
 
column 
percentage 100 100 100 
* Non-competitive SIC codes were codes that sold products where Wal-
Mart did not sell an alternative. 
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Table A2.4 
Business status by relative location for Wal-Mart area firms* 
Location 
relative to Wal-
Mart 
 
In 2005 
survey only 
(out-of-
business) 
In 2007 
survey only 
(new 
business) 
In both 
2005 and 
2007 
survey Total 
Northwest frequency 414 228 731 1373 
 row percentage 30.15 16.61 53.24 100 
 
column 
percentage 31.65 32.17 35.31 33.69 
Northeast frequency 373 244 654 1271 
 row percentage 29.35 19.2 51.46 100 
 
column 
percentage 28.52 35.01 31.59 31.19 
Southeast frequency 199 88 235 522 
 row percentage 38.12 16.86 45.02 100 
 
column 
percentage 15.21 12.63 11.35 12.81 
Southwest frequency 322 137 450 909 
 row percentage 35.42 15.07 49.5 100 
 
column 
percentage 24.62 19.66 21.74 22.31 
Total frequency 1308 697 2070 4075 
 row percentage 32.1 17.1 50.8 100 
 
column 
percentage 100 100 100 100 
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Table A2.5A  
Regressions to predict out-of-business status for Wal-Mart area firms 
 OLS Probit Probit Probit Probit 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Distance to Wal-Mart 
(miles) 
-
0.0139** 
-
0.0366** 
-
0.0367** -0.0413** -0.0363 
 (1.98) (1.97) (1.97) (1.98) (1.29)  
In competitive SIC code   0.0147 0.173*** 0.0636 
   (0.33) (3.39) (0.97) 
Number of employees 2005    
-
0.0130*** 
-
0.0135*** 
    (3.34) (2.72) 
Sales volume 2005 ($s)     
-6.90e-
08** 
     (2.05) 
Year business started     0.0105*** 
     (3.88) 
Constant 0.421*** 
-
0.198*** 
-
0.206*** -0.284*** -21.28*** 
 (21.94) (3.94) (3.68) (4.30) (3.94) 
Observations 3378 3378 3378 2944 1802 
R-squared 0.001     
Pseudo R-squared  0.001 0.001 0.021 0.026 
Absolute t statistics in parentheses     
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01      
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Table A2.5B  
Regression to predict out-of-business status for 
Wal-Mart area firms 
(includes SIC dummies, building materials omitted 
category) 
 Probit 
 (1) 
Distance to Wal-Mart (miles) -0.0466 
 (1.62) 
In competitive SIC code -0.146 
 (1.35) 
Number of employees 2005 -0.0112** 
 (2.28) 
Sales volume 2005 ($s) 
-7.50e-
08** 
 (2.18) 
Year business started 0.0100*** 
 (3.74) 
General merchandise stores (SIC 53) 0.338 
 (1.31) 
Food stores (SIC 54) 0.246 
 (1.29) 
Automotive dealers and gasoline 
service stations (SIC 55) 0.151 
 (0.71) 
Apparel and accessory stores (SIC 
56) 0.467** 
 (2.34) 
Furniture, home furnishings and 
equipment stores (SIC 57) 0.452** 
 (2.24) 
Eating and drinking places (SIC 58) 0.0601 
 (0.30) 
Miscellaneous retail (SIC 59) 0.337* 
 (1.84) 
Constant -20.43*** 
 (3.82) 
  
Observations 1789 
R-squared  
Pseudo R-squared 0.032 
Absolute t statistics in parentheses  
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01  
 
Table A2.6  
  57 
Distance (in miles) to Wal-Mart of existing 
and new businesses in 2007 Dun & 
Bradstreet survey 
Closest Existing New 
1% 0.29 0.24 
5% 0.71 0.76 
10% 0.99 0.98 
25% 1.61 1.57 
50% 2.32 2.26 
75% 31.2 3.12 
90% 3.73 3.67 
95% 4.62 4.62 
99% 6.19 6.37 
 
 
Table A2.7A 
OLS Regressions to predict change in employment for Wal-Mart area firms 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Distance to Wal-Mart (miles) 0.00758 0.00643 0.0282 0.0289 0.0336 
 (0.18) (0.15) (0.67) (0.69) (0.71) 
In competitive SIC code  0.0932 -0.0397 -0.0343 0.0479 
  (0.98) (0.48) (0.41) (0.43) 
Number of employees 2005   
-
0.0232*** 
-
0.0219*** 
-
0.0236*** 
   (6.45) (5.31) (4.91) 
Sales volume 2005 ($s)    -3.16e-08 -2.83e-08 
    (0.91) (0.82) 
Year business started     -0.00274 
     (0.68) 
Constant -0.0957 -0.146 0.038 0.0419 5.441 
 (0.88) (1.26) (0.35) (0.39) (0.67) 
Observations 211 211 211 211 141 
R-squared 0 0.005 0.185 0.191 0.249 
# sample restricted to firms with differing non-zero sales in 2005 and 2007 surveys 
Absolute t statistics in parentheses     
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01      
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Table A2.7B  
Regression to predict percentage change in employment for 
Wal-Mart area firms 
(includes SIC dummies, building materials omitted category) 
 (1) 
Distance to Wal-Mart (miles) 0.0406 
 (0.75) 
In competitive SIC code -0.0942 
 (0.32) 
Number of employees 2005 -0.0232*** 
 (4.37) 
Sales volume 2005 ($s) -2.31E-08 
 (0.66) 
Year business started -0.00155 
 (0.38) 
General merchandise stores (SIC 53) -0.443 
 (0.78) 
Food stores (SIC 54) -0.0188 
 (0.06) 
Automotive dealers and gasoline service 
stations (SIC 55) -0.542** 
 (1.99) 
Apparel and accessory stores (SIC 56) -0.26 
 (1.25) 
Furniture, home furnishings and equipment 
stores (SIC 57) -0.282 
 (1.33) 
Eating and drinking places (SIC 58) -0.453 
 (1.43) 
Miscellaneous retail (SIC 59) -0.328 
 (1.56) 
Constant 3.46 
 (0.43) 
Observations 129 
R-squared 0.295 
# sample restricted to firms with differing non-zero sales in 
2005 and 2007 surveys 
Absolute t statistics in parentheses  
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2.8A  
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OLS Regressions to predict change in sales for Wal-Mart area firms# 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
     
Distance to Wal-Mart 
(miles) 
-
0.0309 
-
0.0332 -0.018 -0.0144 0.000987 
 (0.58) (0.64) (0.34) (0.28) (0.02) 
In competitive SIC code  0.300** 0.206* 0.236** 0.336** 
  (2.4) (1.69) (2.04) (2.1) 
Number of employees 
2005 
  
-
0.0170*** -0.00994** -0.00991* 
   (3.96) (2.19) (1.77) 
Sales volume 2005 ($s)    
-
0.000000174*** 
-
0.000000173*** 
    (5.2) (5.16) 
Year business started     0.000306 
     (0.06) 
Constant 
-
0.0832 -0.247* -0.109 -0.0876 -0.788 
 (0.61) (1.67) (0.77) (0.67) (0.08) 
      
Observations 214 214 212 212 142 
R-squared 0.002 0.029 0.08 0.177 0.219 
# sample restricted to firms with differing non-zero sales in 2005 and 2007 surveys 
Absolute t statistics in parentheses     
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2.8B  
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Regression to predict percentage change in sales for Wal-
Mart area firms 
(includes SIC dummies, building materials omitted 
category)# 
 (1) 
 -0.00498 
Distance to Wal-Mart (miles) (0.08) 
 -0.11 
In competitive SIC code (0.27) 
 -0.00921 
Number of employees 2005 (1.24) 
 -0.000000192*** 
Sales volume 2005 ($s) (4.31) 
 0.000357 
Year business started (0.07) 
 -0.538 
General merchandise stores (SIC 
53) (0.73) 
 -0.165 
Food stores (SIC 54) (0.36) 
 -0.29 
Automotive dealers and gasoline 
service stations (SIC 55) (0.54) 
 -0.262 
Apparel and accessory stores (SIC 
56) (0.6) 
 -0.308 
Furniture, home furnishings and 
equipment stores (SIC 57) (0.77) 
 -0.938* 
Eating and drinking places (SIC 58) (1.91) 
 -0.378 
Miscellaneous retail (SIC 59) (0.95) 
 -0.114 
Constant (0.01) 
  
Observations 130 
R-squared 0.263 
# sample restricted to firms with differing non-zero sales in 
2005 and 2007 surveys 
Absolute t statistics in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01  
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